Authoritarian Warning Survey polls democracy experts on threats to democracy from American political leaders in 2017. Respondents are academic scholars who study democratic decline, political institutions, American politics, or countries that have recently experienced democratic erosion. From May through November, we have received 375 responses from 1691 contacts (a response rate of 22.2%).* Initially, we ran and analyzed the survey once each month.

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In our current version, we survey a randomly selected sub-sample of our respondent pool (~600 scholars) each weekday. Every day, we calculate a rolling average of these responses as a Democracy Threat Index. This is a live measure of democracy scholars' views on threats to American democracy. Our method weights responses by time and also continually analyzes the data for discrete breaks in threat levels that may indicate major events. You can read more detail about how we construct the Index here.

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For comparison, we asked the same questions in June for five other countries: the United Kingdom, Canada, India, Poland, and Hungary. Separate respondents were chosen for each. All are experts on their respective country, with a rough balance of experts based in the country and living abroad. Across the five surveys, 71 experts responded (from 307 contacted, a response rate of 23.1%).

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We acknowledge there are important concerns about ideological balance in academic surveys of this kind. See below for three aspects of our survey that help to mitigate this potential bias.**

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Survey Questions

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Drawing on common patterns of recent democratic erosion, we ask about six categories of threats to democracy:

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• Treatment of Media: Leaders' treatment of media, respect for free press, and transparency

• Executive Constraints: Effective constraints of executive against abuses of power; leaders' respect for judiciary, legislature, and rule of law

• Elections and Treatment of Opposition: Respect for free and fair elections and legitimacy of opposition

• Civil Liberties: Respect for core freedoms (such as speech, assembly, religion, and privacy)

• Civil Violence: Use of violence, intimidation, or paramilitary organizations for political ends

• Rhetoric: Speech by political leaders indicating democratic erosion or weak normative attachment to democracy

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For each category, respondents can choose among five responses:

1. Within range of a normally functioning consolidated democracy

2. Moderate violations atypical of a consolidated democracy, but that don't yet threaten breakdown

3. Violations that signal significant erosion of democracy quality and warn of high potential for breakdown in future

4. Critical violations that seriously threaten near-term survival

5. Violations severe enough to make system non-democratic

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For the Democracy Threat Index, these responses are re-scaled to 0-100. For the monthly results, we leave them as 1-5.

 

We also ask respondents about (1) the likelihood of democratic breakdown, (2) whether democratic quality and stability has improved or declined over the last 10 years (so the comparison is to a Republican president), and (3) what recent events or actions (if any) they consider most threatening to democracy.

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Click here for the exact text of the survey.

Click here for the full survey results from May-November (anonymized).

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October U.S. Results: (Average) (Median) (Range)

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See here for a fuller analysis of the November results.

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Treatment of Media (2.9) (3) (1-4)

• One respondent pointed to "The president's attacks on press legitimacy (including threatening licenses, attacking journalists abroad, etc.)"

• Others pointed to the "threats against traditional media" and the "challenging [of] press freedom through president's rhetoric and by threatening licenses."

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Executive Constraints (3.0) (3) (1-4)

• One respondent warned of the "Ongoing threats to media and judiciary. Lack of political will to hold officials accountable. Lack of civilian oversight over military."

• Another warned of "unchecked state coercive powers; rhetoric regarding the criminalization of opposition."

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Elections and Treatment of Opposition (2.5) (2.5) (1-4)

• One respondent pointed to "attempts to exclude racial and ethnic groups and youth from voting."

• Another respondent instead warned of "DNC misbehavior during Pres Primary season."

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Civil Liberties (2.1) (2) (1-5)

• Several criticized the president's attacks on protestors and free media.

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Civil Violence (1.8) (2) (1-4)

• Several respondents referenced the President's response to Charlottesville, one calling it a "legitimization of extremist violent movements."

• One warned of the "tolerance of paramilitary activity and anti-constitutional groups."

 

Rhetoric (3.3) (3.5) (1-4)

• One respondent warned of the "President's disregard for democratic norms and increasing rhetoric against media [and] opposition."

• One respondent noted "The president's rhetoric on the media, Charlottesville, etc. is concerning, although so far he's been able to do very little. This may change if a crisis happens or the Russia investigation proceeds."

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​We also asked about respondents' guesses on the likelihood that American democracy breaks down (by their definition) within the next four years.

• The average estimate was 10.5%.

• The median estimate was 8%.

• Estimates ranged from 0 to 50%. Only 4 of 42 answered 0.

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Lastly, we asked whether "the quality and stability of American democracy" had improved or declined over the last 10 years (chosen so the comparison point is also under a Republican president). Respondents answered on a five-point scale, from "much worse" to "much better."

• 86% indicated decline for American democracy.

• 36% indicated that American democracy was "much worse."

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Results for Other Countries

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For each country, we list the average rating across the six threat categories, the percentage of all responses indicating behavior outside the norm for consolidated democracies (2+), the average predicted likelihood of democratic breakdown, and the percentage saying democratic stability and quality has declined. The U.S. in July is shown for comparison.

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Country: Avg. rating / % outside norm / % breakdown / % decline

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United States:     2.61 / 86.9% / 10.5% / 85.7%

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United Kingdom: 1.23 / 20.0% / 2.6% / 40.0%

Canada:                 1.21 / 20.6% / 0.4% / 5.9%

India:                      2.17 / 75.8% / 15.5% / 81.8%

Poland:                  2.28 / 75.6% / 23.5% / 84.6%

Hungary:              2.90 / 91.5% / 44.2% / 95.0%

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Click here for our October survey results.

Click here for our September survey results.

Click here for our August survey results.

Click here for our July survey results.

Click here for our June survey results.

Click here for our May survey results.

You can find coverage of our monthly survey in Washington Post's Monkey Cage blog here and in The Atlantic here.

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* All survey results are anonymous. The survey was supported by IRB certification #051706 (29200) at George Washington University.

 

** First, we made an effort to include conservative academics in our sample. Several answers indicate conservative participation (e.g., one respondent claims that "the real threats to American democracy took place during the Obama administration"). Second, the five other countries serve as credible comparison points, as four of these countries have right-of-center governments and all have academics that tilt left. Thus, any ideological bias should be roughly held constant. Third, we employ reasonably concrete questions. Rather than ask about general approval of current politics, we ask respondents to compare to other consolidated democracies and evaluate whether events threaten democratic survival. As a positive sign, only one response (0.4% of total) had the value 5 (the greatest threat) in November, indicating that respondents are not amplifying the threat for effect.

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